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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JIS J. MONTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
iTZER'S SPECIALTY B~EAD 
IOMPANY, a corporation 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
12810 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
AND 
BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
~spondent respectfully petitiomthis court for a re-
~ing in this matter on the grounds set forth below and 
Bupport thereof submits the following brief: 
1 1) This court erred in assuming that Continental Bak-
[Company terminated its business with Kratzers for rea-
~ other than the tort committed by Monter. The only 
lon given was the closing of the business by· Monter. 
~ 2) This court erred in stating that the monthly sales 
Fatzers to Continental were reduced "so that the 
tage was only $2, 000. 00 per month. " The evidence was 
fsales to Continental were $2,000.00 per month in 
ember, 1971 although they had been higher in the past. 
3) This court erred in holding that the lower court's 
flllent was based upon speculation. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amore complete statement of facts is found in Respon-
it's Brief but most of the facts important to this petition 
1 
briefly given here. 
This action was initially brought by Monter under the 
,awful detainer statute for default in rent payments. A 
'ault judgment was entered giving Monter possession of the 
iperty. No judgment was given for rent nor was it prayed 
:, Monter caused an execution to be served upon Kratzers 
1
1had the sheriff close the business, evict all employees and 
1
nge the locks on the doors. This court has upheld the 
1er court's determination that the judgment was void for 
.lure to determine the amount of rent due and the execution 
1
aviolation of Kratzers' rights under the unlawful de-
ner statute. Kratzers is therefore entitled to any re-
hng damages. 
While Kratzers place of business was closed down, Conti-
ital Baking Company, a customer of Kratzers for more than 
!teen years, was unable to call its orders into Kratzers. 
hnental' s Sales Manager, Jack Hart, thereupon personally 
t to Kratzers' Bakery, found the premises locked and no-
y present and then placed their orders with another bakery. 
~that day on, in spite of Kratzer' s at tempts to regain its 
~ness, Continental has refused to buy from Kratzer' s be-
se, in view of the closing of the business, it had no 
~mce that it would continue to get products from Kratzers. 
hough Continental had experienced some quality and delivery 
Hems with Kratzer' s, Mr. Hart testified that these were 
iidered normal and typical of other bakers as well. He 
iher testified that Continental would not have terminated 
long-standing relationship with Kratzer' s except for 
lr inability to obtain products on November 8, 1971, and 
had this incident on November 8, 1971, been the only inci-
te occur, Continental would still have terminated the 
unt. 
It was stipulated at the trial that sales by Kratzer' s 
:ontinental were $2,000.00 per month and that $1,060.00 of 
lwas profit. Based upon the evidence that the business 
ltionship between Kratzer' s _and Continental would not have 
3 
terminated except for the actions of Monter, the lower 1n 
·t entered judgment for the present value of $1,060.00 
~ . h f r month over ten years into t e uture. 
By its opinion filed December 5, 1972, this court re-
rsed the judgment for damages for loss of business claiming 
tit was based upon speculation. The opinion makes certain 
:tements which are in error and the court's reliance upon 
im caused an improper reversal of the judgment for damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT CONTINENTAL BAKING COM-
IT TERMINATED ITS BUSINESS WITH KRATZERS FOR REASONS OTHER 
Ul THE TORT COMMITTED BY MONTER. THE ONLY REASON GIVEN WAS 
I CLOSING OF THE BUSINESS BY MONTER. 
This court's opinion referred to some prior quality and 
.ivery problems that Continental had with Kratzers and a 
ltement that this entered into the decision to terminate the 
1ount with Kratzers in assuming that Monter was not entirely 
~Mible for Kratzer's loss of business. In doing so this 
1rt ignores the trial court's discretion to believe or dis-
iieve the testimony of a witness whose demeanor and other 
)tors are observed by it. This court also ignores all of 
1 other evidence proving that Monter' s actions were the sole 
~on for terminating the account. Following the testimony 
Jack Hart quoted in this court's opinion is this statement 
129): 
"Q Had this incident on November the 8th been the 
only incident to occur in your experience, would 
you have terminated the account? 
A I think, under the conditions that existed that 
day, yes." 
On page 125 of the record Mr. Hart testified as follows: 
" He called 
wanted me to 
the business 
lar day; and 
me while I was in Provo, Utah, and 
give him more business, or give him back 
that we had switched over that particu-
I stated that I didn't feel that we 
4 
could, because I had no assurance that we would con-
tinue to get products from him, in view of what had 
d " happene . 
ther on page 128 of the record Mr. Hart stated that the ~lity and delivery problems were normal and that they had the 
ne problems with other bakers as well. Then it was stated: 
"Q In spite of those other problems you have mentioned 
was your inability to get products on November the 
8th the reason for your termination of your business 
with Kratzer's? 
A Yes, I'd say so. 
Q Would it be fair to say that you would not have 
terminated that relationship then except for that 
inability? 
A Yes." 
There can be no other conclusion from the above testimony 
ITT that the sixteen-plus year relationship with Continental 
~d have continued indefinitely into the future except for 
wrongful actions of Monter. There was absolutely no evi-
1ce to the contrary offered by Monter. The trial court was 
uly justified in finding that Monter was the cause of this 
~ of business and it was error for this court to disturb 
t finding on appellate review. See Charlton v. Rackett, 
gtah 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE MONTHLY SALES BY 
rZERS TO CONTINENTAL WERE REDUCED "SO THAT THE AVERAGE WAS 
~ ~2,000.00 PER MONTH." THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT SALES TO CON-
~NTAL WERE $2,000.00 PER MONTH IN NOVEMBER, 1971 ALTHOUGH 
,HAD BEEN HIGHER IN THE PAST. 
I 
In three separate places the court's opinion refers to the 
'ulation of the parties that average monthly sales to Conti-
tal were $2 ,000. 00 per month and then assumes that, because 
ls had been $5,000.00 per month at one time in the past, 
tmust have been substantially below $2,000.00 in November, 
I and therefore the future sales might be even less or non-
ltent. 
5 
, In the first place the stipulation of the parties was 
it the average gross business done with Continental through-
· the year would be $2,000.00 per month (R. 153). This 
[ulation was made for the purpose of avoiding the necessity 
iengthy and detailed proof and to allow the court to rely 
that figure as the monthly loss to Kratzer' s to occur in 
i future if the court found in favor of Kratzers on the 
;ue of liability. The court should not go beyond this 
.pulation of the parties. It takes the place of a finding 
fact that the loss to Kratzer' s would be $2 ,000. 00 per 
ith in the future. It involves no speculation by the court 
iis the agreed upon figure to be used in calculating dam-
!s ,fter the issue of liability is determined. The parties 
imselves considered all of the factors involved in arriving 
the stipulated figure, any increases or declines through-
: the year, seasonal variations, etc. The stipulation it-
.f removed all matters of speculation from the court. It 
1 only the stipulated figure to rely upon. 
' 
To further counter the court's assumption that sales in 
ternber, 1971 were substantially less than $2,000.00 per 
1th, the testimony of Mr. Yeck on page 159 of the record 
1ressly states that $2, 000. 00 per month was the volume of 
liness done with them "now" - meaning at the time of termi-
lion of the account. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT'S 
k;MENT WAS BASED UPON SPECULATION. 
1 It is general law that future damages cannot be based 
I
n speculation. There must be some basis upon which to cal-
ate those damages. However, this court enters into a high 
\ree of speculation when it decides that, because the rela-. 
ln~ship between Kratzers and Continental could have been ter-
ated at any time, it would have been terminated and there-
Kratzers is not entitled to any damages. There is no 
dence to indicate that either party would have terminated 
~relationship. All the evidence is to the contrary. As 
~n by the testimony quoted in Point I above, it was termi-
ed because of Monter's actions and would not have been ter-
1ated except for Monter's actions. That indicates only that 
~ long-standing relationship would have continued indefi-
Jely. 
6 
, It should be kept in mind that Monter committed a wrong 
·nst Kratzer' s and it is obvious that Kratzer' s suffered a 
Jga1 
l 
6 
because of it. No one can know how long Continental would 
~~e done business with Kratzers just as no one can know how 
:ong the family "bre~dw~nner" would ha':7e lived in a. wrongful 
leath action. Yet, it is the prerogative of the trier of 
, cts to determine that q ues ti on in assessing damages. Here, ~e trier of facts determined that the relationship would have 
:ontinued for at least ten more years and assessed damages 
iccordingly. This court might decide that five years or two 
rears or even twenty years was a more likely period of time. 
iut it would have continued for some period of time and there-
:ore some damages should be allowed. 
Reference is made to the authorities cited in Point III of 
~~ondent's brief to the effect that uncertainty merely as to 
'he amount of lost profits does not prevent recovery and the 
[efendant is not allowed to insist on absolute certainty when 
!s wrongful act prevents determination of exact damages. In 
ha; situation lost profits can be determined by reasonable in-
erence as the lower court did here. In Freeway Park Building, 
~c. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 
, 2d 778 (1969), this court stated that the jury should be 
bowed to determine lost profits where there• was less evidence 
nsupport thereof than there is present here. Prior earnings 
Fe not known exactly and no evidence of future earnings was 
~ven yet the jury should be allowed to "infer" the amount of 
amages. The court's opinion here amounts to an overruling of 
~at case and therefore should be reconsidered in a rehearing 
f the matters referred to herein. "Reasonable inference" 
snot speculation in the legal sense. 
CONCLUSION 
i 
i For the reasons above stated, respondent respectfully 
lays that this court grant a rehearing in order that it may consider its opinion herein and allow respondent damages r the wrongful actions committed by appellant. 
7 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Defendant-
. Respondent 
